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FIREARMS COSTS, FIREARMS BENEFITS
AND THE LEMITS OF KNOWLEDGE
DANIEL D. POLSBY*
America's intensifying dismay about violent crime has become so
pervasive that one may well affirm that there is something of a "na-
tional crime crisis." Yet there is something of a puzzle as well. Overall
crime rates in the United States have been falling for nearly twenty
years. Violent crime, declining on a national basis for the last three
years, has not changed dramatically since 1980, especially in compari-
son to the startling run-up in serious crime that coincided with the
maturation of the post-war birth cohort. The homicide rate has fluc-
tuated to some extent, but despite recent increases it is still below the
levels of the late 1970s and indeed, below the rates recorded though
most of the 1920s.
To some extent the growth of public apprehension concerning
violent crime can be explained by its cumulative nature: "[wle experi-
ence the crime wave not as separate moments in time but as one long
descending night."' When serious crime touches oneself or one's
family, it is an event that is more or less present throughout one's life.
The direction of crime rates should be less important, therefore, than
changes in the number of people whose lives have been touched by
crime. This number may constantly increase through a generation or
more though the crime rate falls. It should be obvious, however, that
cumulative enlargement of the circle of people who have been victim-
ized by crime can be at best an incomplete explanation for the change
in public attitude that is taking place. Public attitudes about crime
have changed much more rapidly than the size of its population of
victims. "The crime crisis" is a crisis of confidence in the ability of the
public sector to address the crime problem constructively. As such it
is very much a part of the tide of skepticism about the role of govern-
* Kirkland & Ellis Professor of Law, Northwestern University. Grateful acknowledge-
ment is made to the Kirkland & Ellis Research Fund and the William M. Trumbull Re-
search Fund, each of which partly subsidized the preparation of this paper. The research
assistance of James K. Fitzpatrick, M.D., is also acknowledged with thanks. None of the
above are to be held responsible for any of the ideas or attempted ideas expressed herein.
1 Adam Walinsky, The Crisis of Public Order, 276 ATLAirc MoNTHLYJuly 1995, at 41, 44.
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ment that has been an expanding feature of partisan political dis-
course in recent years. Liberalized carry concealed laws are essentially
a response to intensifying doubt about the capacity of government-
the police, the courts, and the corrections system-to deliver ade-
quate levels of public or personal security. Serious questions remain,
however, concerning the ability of private sector practices to deliver
the goods where the public sector has failed.
Because the techniques of social science are clumsy, the informa-
tion generated is often nebulous and hard to interpret. Seldom do
social researchers have the luxury enjoyed by Rutherford or Michael-
son, of performing a crucial experiment and then proclaiming that a
definite increment in human understanding has been attained. So-
cial scientists must sort through literatures filled with hints and inti-
mations in order to get an idea of what is definitely known, and even
then gains in knowledge are most often of the null variety, as we fail to
find good evidence to support a hypothesis. The problem is in-
grained in firearms research, because few if any criminologists believe
that guns are the sole factor promoting anti-social behavior. It is not
guns themselves, but guns plus additional variables, that lead to
trouble. Getting much beyond that generality has been frustrating,
and has often seemed something akin to biologists investigating mi-
crobes with binoculars. Firearms effects on crime rates-what good
do guns do and what harm do they do-seem to be at most quite
marginal, and of course available investigative techniques are of seri-
ously limited power. Still, the game is worth the candle if undertaken
with proper circumspection, for though accessions to knowledge from
any given study may be small, the matter ultimately under scrutiny,
that of personal and collective security, is of perennial concern.
In recent years a number of states, including Alaska, Arizona,
Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Mississippi, Montana, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wyoming, have relaxed
their laws regulating civilians' carrying of concealed firearms, thus
joining Connecticut, Indiana, Vermont, and Washington in adopting
regimes significantly more permissive than those typical in the rest of
the country. A number of other states currently have similar modifica-
tions under consideration. The two questions that these amendments
beg-and indeed that they may eventually help to answer-are: (1)
whether widely permitted civilian handgun carriage risks turning
every argument between strangers into a wild west shoot-'em-up, or,
conversely; (2) whether increasing the prevalence of concealed hand-
guns drives the crime rate down. These are the questions David
McDowall, Colin Loftin, and Brian Wiersema seek to measure with
interrupted time series analysis, looking at the experience in the larg-
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est urban areas of Florida (Miami, Jacksonville, and Tampa), Missis-
sippi (Jackson) and Oregon (Portland). What they found was
statistically significant enlargements in firearms homicides in three of
the five cities and insignificant changes in Portland and Miami.
In order properly to evaluate the findings of studies like this one,
it is useful to bear in mind the theoretical reasons that might be ad-
duced either to believe or to doubt whether liberalizing civilian access
to firearms actually will enhance either the general security of the
public or (what is a distinct question) the private security of the per-
son who arms himself. The argument in favor of liberalized gun laws
would point to their usefulness as a means of deterring attackers.
There is no a priori reason to believe that firearms should be any less
useful to civilians, at least those properly trained to use them, than to
police officers. Open carrying of a side ann tends to create a private
security good (i.e., by "hardening" a particular target), whereas con-
cealed carrying, if it is believed to be reasonably widespread, should
tend to create a public security good because it will not be evident to a
predator which potential victims or bystanders might have the means
to resist attack.
There are also theoretical reasons for skepticism. One is that if
an argument blows up between two people, resort to a handgun
would confer what is sometimes called a "first mover" advantage. Hos-
tile confrontations between latent antagonists, each of whom esti-
mates that the other is (with some probability) armed, may
catastrophically degenerate into gunplay as each recognizes the ad-
vantage of beating the other to the draw and the detriment of being
beaten. Environments in which "first movers" possess a strategic
edge-what in international arms reductions talks would be called a
"first strike capability," are well understood to be intrinsically unsta-
ble 2 Another theoretical reason that points in the same direction was
suggested separately by Frank Zimring3 and Philip Cook4, who ex-
plained why higher levels of civilian armaments (what is called in
jargon "gun density") would be associated with higher levels of homi-
cide. This theory is based on the observation that many homicidal
assaults are not accompanied by a specific intention to kill but rather
2 JEROME H. KAHAN, SEcuRrry IN THE Nucr.E. AGE 273 (1975); HERmAN KAHN, ON
THERMONUCLEAR WAR (1969); HERmAN KAHN, THINKING ABouT THE UNTHINKABLE IN THE
1980's (1984); THOMAS C. SCHEIJ.NG, THE STgATE OF CoNacr 232 (1960); THOMAs C.
SCHELLING, ARMS AND INFLUENCE 224-25 (1966); Wolfgang K.H. Panofsky, The Mutual Hos-
tage Relationship Between America and Russia, 52 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 109 (1973); Albert Wohl-
stetter, The Delicate Balance of Terror, 37 FOREIGN AFFmxRs 211 (1959).
3 Frank Zimring, Is Gun Control Likely to Reduce Violent Killings?, 35 U. CHI. L REv. 721,
735 (1968).
4 Philip Cook, The Technology of Personal Vwlence, 14 CRIME &JusT. 1, 13 (1991).
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are mercurial outbursts whose lethality will depend on the virulence
of the weapons at hand. Guns are much more lethal, wound for
wound, than other weapons. 5 When the ratio of firearms to non-fire-
arms weapons increases, one should expect to see increases in the rate
of homicide, and conversely, holding all else constant.
McDowall, Loftin, and Wiersema do not actually test the Zimring-
Cook hypothesis, because their study focuses on the relationship be-
tween the liberalization of carry concealed weapons laws and, not
murder rates, but firearms murder rates. Hence, their study does not
measure the size of the margin in which homicidally tending persons
will substitute non-firearms weapons when firearms become more dif-
ficult to get. But it does reach conclusions consistent with those in a
number of studies over the past decade that find connections between
firearms laws and rates of homicide and suicide. The most widely
publicized contributions have appeared in the New England Journal of
Medicine, authored by John Sloan and collaborators,6 Arthur Kel-
lermann and collaborators, 7 and Loftin, McDowall, and Wiersema
themselves.8 Taken together, these papers have affected to establish
not only that restricting civilian access to firearms saves lives (i.e., is a
sound public health measure analogous to abating a disease vector
from the environment), but also-an especial theme of Dr. Kel-
lermann's-that firearms do not increase the personal security of
those who possess them but, on the contrary, actually constitute a "risk
factor" for becoming a homicide victim. Such results have received
wide media coverage and have considerably gratified those who dis-
dain firearms, the "gun culture," and the people and artifacts taken to
be associated with them. However, the actual results of this research
look far more modest if one actually reads the text of the monographs
rather than the many press notices that accompanied their publica-
tion. As a threshold point, it is seriously debatable whether either the
Sloan or the Kellermann results should be credited at all, because the
data on which their work rests was neither deposited with the New
England Journal nor otherwise made available to independent
5 GARY KLECK, POINT BLANK GUNS AND VIOLENCE IN AMERICA 164 (1991).
6 John H. Sloan et al., Firearm Regulation and Rates of Suicide, 322 NEw ENG.J. MED. 369,
373 (1990);John H. Sloan et al., Handgun Regulations, Crime, Assaults, and Homicide: A Tale
of Two Cities, 319 NEw ENG.J. MED. 1256, 1261 (1988).
7 Arthur L Kellermann et al., Gun Ownership as a Risk Factor for Homicide in the Home,
329 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1084, 1090 (1993); Arthur L. Kellermann & Donald T. Reay, Protec-
tion or Peril7: An Analysis of Firearm-Related Deaths in the Home, 314 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1557,
1559 (1986).
8 Colin Loftin et al., Effects of Restrictive Licensing of Handguns on Homicide and Suicide in
the District of Columbia, 325 NEw ENC.J. MED. 1615, 1620 (1991).
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researchers. 9
Even if one takes the papers at face value, however, they do not
make a trustworthy case either for the Kellermann et al. "victimiza-
tion-risk factor" hypothesis or for the Sloan et al. "firearms density
relates to homicide" hypothesis. Kellermann et al. should not have
been surprised to find that homicide victims are armed in dispropor-
tionate numbers: a large and growing proportion of victims are
criminals themselves;' 0 it is rational (if not usually legal) for people
who might be embarrassed to call upon official police services to arm
themselves, especially if, as is true of the narcotics demi-monde, the risk
of being killed by competitors, creditors and others in the business are
great" and no doubt known to be great. It is unpersuasive to main-
tain that homicide victimization follows handgun ownership in a
causal sequence, as though possession of a weapon could somehow
magnetize murderers to ones' doorstoop. Sloan et al. made a great
deal out of differences in firearms murder and suicide rates in the
assertedly matched cities of Seattle, Washington, with its relatively
slack gun control laws, and Vancouver, B.C., with its relatively strict
laws. Among several important questions discounted by this method-
ology is whether and to what extent the state of the law is a satisfactory
proxy for the actual density of firearms. There are, of course, large
conceptual and practical distinctions between "how has the law
changed" and "how has gun-possession behavior changed." The sec-
ond of these questions cannot be answered by assumption rather than
with data. At least one researcher, moreover, has expressed doubts
that the assumption is correct.12
It is noteworthy that the authors of Concealed Firearms Laws stop
short of making the claim that relaxing concealed carry laws "will"
lead to higher rates of firearms homicides. They do, however, end
9 Brandon Centerwall notes that Sloan has not made his data available. Brandon
Centerwall, Homicide and the Prevalence of Handguns: Canada and the United States, 1976-1980,
134 AM.J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 1245, 1246 (1991). Professor Henry Schaeffer of the North Caro-
lina State University Genetics Department made a telephone request and Professor Law-
rence Southwick of the SUNY-Buffalo School of Management Sciences a written request to
Dr. Kellermann to inspect the data on which his 1998 study was based. Neither was
honored.
10 Chicago Police Department reports show that the percentage of Chicago homicide
victims with police records has been as high as 65% in recent individual years. See, e.g.,
DErEcrrvE DIVISION, CHICAGO Po,,cE DEP'T, MuRDER ANALYsis 23 (1992) (65.53% of homi-
cide victims in 1992 had criminal records). In the early 1970s, the corresponding figures
were 40%-45%. Id.
1 1 Peter Reuter & Mark A.R. Kleiman, Risks and Prices: An Economic Analysis of DrugEn-
forcement, 7 CRIME &Jusr.: ANN. REV. R.S. 289, 305 (1986).
12 RobertJ. Mundt, Gun Control and Rates of Firearms Violence in Canada and the United
States, 32 CAN.J. CRwMINOLOGY 137, 137-54 (1990).
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their paper with a warning against repealing restrictive carry con-
cealed laws. The benefit of this form of gun control is discreetly char-
acterized as the weaker of two conclusions that emerge from the
analysis (the stronger being that liberalized concealed carry laws do
not have a measurable crime-fighting effect), but the result can hardly
be thought a strong foundation upon which to build public policy.
The issue, in brief, is what is called the specification problem, a
chronic pitfall of time series studies. It is often difficult to know how
to interpret findings when the direction taken by a dependent varia-
ble (e.g., the homicide rate) exhibits great sensitivity to the time pe-
riod selected for examination.' 3 McDowall, Loftin, and Wiersema's
own previous work on the 1976 District of Columbia gun control law
illustrates the objection clearly.14 The authors' conclusion there-
that the gun control law prevented an average of forty-seven deaths
per year from homicides and suicides-seems doubtful because not
only did they fail to give a measure of firearms density that was in-
dependent of the ordinance itself, but, to their professed surprise, the
numbers seemed to them to indicate that the law had operated virtu-
ally instantaneously to suppress the rate of homicides by firearms. In
other words, their study finds a beneficial effect from simply imple-
menting the law, that shows up in the homicide statistics before it
could possibly have had an appreciable effect on the actual distribu-
tion of firearms in the jurisdiction. It is not clear why this should be
the case, but the effect is plain to see in the data. 15
Or is it? In the D.C. study, for example, the authors looked at a
number of years in which homicides and suicides by firearms were
generally declining. If different periods had been selected for mea-
surement-the D.C. study stopped in 1988-it would have been nec-
essary to explain the long-term association between restrictive gun
control laws and increased homicide rates as the District's numbers,
both for homicide and firearms homicide, climbed steadily higher in
the late 1980's. Currently these rates much exceed those in any state
notwithstanding the District's more stringent gun control laws. 16 Or,
13 Gary Kleck et al., The Emperor has No Clothes: Using Interrupted Times Series De-
sign to Evaluate Social Policy Impact (Oct. 30, 1993) (unpublished manuscript, presented
to the American Society of Criminology).
14 Loftin et al., supra note 8, at 1619-20.
15 Glenn Pierce and William Bowers found something similar in their study of Massa-
chusetts' gun control law, and proposed that some sort of "announcement effect" may have
been at work to produce this result. Glenn Pierce & William Bowers, The Bartly-Fox Gun
Law's Short-Term Impact on Crime in Boston, 455 ANNuAts Am. AcrD. POL. & SOC. ScI. 120, 130-
31 (1981). As this proffer amounts to the proposition that publicity about the new gun law
discouraged murderers from shooting people, a bit of skepticism is warranted.
16 The authors believe that the growth of the crack cocaine market and other interven-
ing variables eventually overcame the benefits of the gun control law, and of course, no
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had one chosen to measure firearms homicides,'from mid-1974
through mid-1980-a period in which the rates were trending lower
(though with plenty of month to month variance)-it might have
seemed more natural to associate the decline in the murder rate with
some event more nearly coincident with its beginning-for example,
the resignation of President Nixon or the election of the 94th Con-
gress-rather than with a variable like the gun control law, that com-
menced some two years after the decline in the murder rate had
begun. The null hypothesis actually fits the facts rather exactly: the
murder rate in a given jurisdiction and the state of its statute law relat-
ing to firearms possession have little or nothing to do with one
another.
"Easing Concealed Firearms Laws" exhibits specification difficul-
ties similar to those of the earlier effort. For example, in four of the
five cities studied, 1973 was used as the baseline for beginning the
study, but in Miami, 1983 was used as the baseline because "of an un-
usually sharp increase in homicide rates in May 1980 after an influx of
Cuban refugees. In late 1982 the rates appeared to stabilize."17 Had
Miami been treated uniformly with the other jurisdictions studied
rather than given its own time period, evidently it would have exhib-
ited a statistically significant decrease in homicides instead of no signifi-
cant change. The authors might justify this special treatment as an
appropriate effort at noise reduction in the data, but because the out-
come in this sort of inquiry is so sensitive to changes in the time pe-
riod being studied, the exercise is bound to awaken qualms in the
minds of skeptics, and to further weaken a conclusion that the authors
concede to be weak to begin with. This is not at all meant as a re-
proach to the authors, but rather a cautionary appeal to those unac-
customed to the limitations of this kind of research about the quality
of information that it is capable of generating.18 It is often difficult to
tell the difference between a spurious and a meaningful association
one can say for sure if matters would have been worse had the District's gun control law
not been toughened. The fact remains, however, that neither crack cocaine nor other
social ills were unique to Washington, D.C.: what was unique was its strict gun control law
and a homicide rate that in recent years has been as high as 80 in 100,000 of population
per year-a rate nearly five times higher than that in the next most-sanguinary American
jurisdictions, gun-loving Texas and Louisiana. Loftin et al., supra note 8, at 1620.
17 David McDowall et al., Easing Concealed Firearms Laws: Effects on Homicide in Three
States, 86J. CRIM. L & CRIMINOLOGY 193, 198 (1995).
18 Claims about what this study demonstrates, many of which are plainly more intrepid
than any made by its authors, have received wide currency in the newspapers. Among the
83 mentions of this study in the Nexis data base, for example, was a column by Chicago
Sun-Times editorial writer Cindy Richards, bearing the headline: "Legalizing Hidden Guns
Will Increase Slaughter." Cindy Richards, Legalizing Hidden Guns WI Increase Slaughter,




There is, however, at least one reason that is not indwelling in
methodology to be restrained about basing policy conclusions on
"Easing Concealed Firearms Laws." The paper selects for study three
cities in Florida-but why so? The change in the concealed carry law,
after all, was statewide, and during the period studied, the murder
rate for the state as a whole declined.19 If it increased somewhat in
two of the state's most populous cities and held constant in a third, it
must have decreased considerably elsewhere in the state. Is it the case
that concealed carry laws "caused" matters to get worse in some places
while "causing" them to get better in others? Here one must punt. It
is not impossible for one and the same variable to produce a certain
effect in some circumstances and the opposite effect in other circum-
stances. But it is just as plausible to think that the independent varia-
ble (that is, the change in the state's concealed carry law) was actually
"causing" nothing as to think that it was causing both of two antitheti-
cal effects at once.
There is one quite startling result from the Florida experience
that is given little credence by the authors but that deserves some no-
tice. It appears that not a single one of the homicides studied by
McDowall, Loftin, and Wiersema was committed by someone who had
obtained concealed carry permits under liberalized laws but would
have been denied such permits under prior law. In other words, the
authors concede that the increase in the population entitled to carry
concealed did not contribute directly to any of the excess firearms
mortality found by the study. In that case, then, why was there any
increased killing at all? Easing Concealed Firearms Laws proposes that
"greater tolerance for legal carrying may increase levels of illegal car-
rying as well. For example, criminals have more reason to carry fire-
arms-and to use them-when their victims might be armed."
20
Possibly so-but not obviously so. Indeed, the authors' reasoning
points to the farfetched conclusion that legal carrying of firearms by
police officers would increase illegal carrying by criminals. It also im-
plies that increasing the police presence on the streets would lead to
higher levels of firearms crime. Surely not. In principle, the expected
value of the sort of street crime that is facilitated by brandishing a
firearm should decrease as the chances of being shot by a victim, a
good Samaritan or a police officer, increases. The use of a firearm
confers a decisive tactical advantage on a criminal predator whether
19 Clayton E. Cramer & David B. Kopel, "Shall Issue": The New Wave of Concealed Handgun
Permit Laws, INDEPENDENCE INST. 15 (Oct. 1994) (on file with author).
20 McDowall et al., supra note 17, at 196.
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his victim is armed or not, but from the predator's point of view, use
of a firearm would undoubtedly have greater net utility in a world in
which he had the only gun than it would in a world where some po-
tential targets were secretly armed. Increasing the chances that a
predator may encounter armed prey-or may have to deal with an
armed Good Samaritan-might very well diminish the value of a fire-
arm to him rather than increase it.
When discussing the effects of concealed carry laws, one should
not overlook the evident fact that such laws are capable of putting the
Zimring-Cook hypothesis to a practical test. This hypothesis is un-
doubtedly the most important conjecture in the literature connecting
increasing firearms availability with exacerbated rates of mortality
from interpersonal violence. Indeed, precisely because the Zimring-
Cook argument is a cogent one, it calls for explanation why it is not
borne out more convincingly in the data. One would certainly expect
that legalizing concealed carriage would increase by some amount-
probably a large amount-the number of people who actually do
carry firearms on their persons in public. A number of states have
had permissive concealed carry laws for several years now, and hun-
dreds of thousands of people have applied for and received legal au-
thority to carry guns in thesejurisdictions. There must certainly be, in
a sample so large over a period so long, many hundreds of cases (and
indeed, many tens of thousands) where people legally carrying guns
got drunk, lost their tempers, were in traffic accidents, had domestic
quarrels, and in short, experienced all of the psychological sturm und
drang-which modern life is capable of dishing out-yet so far as a dili-
gent Nexus search discloses, there seems to be not a single case, any-
where in the country, of someone who was legally carrying a
concealed handgun using that weapon in a criminal homicide. Thus,
the best direct evidence currently available that bears on the Zimring-
Cook hypothesis seems to be inconsistent with it.
Perhaps this experience points to nothing more exciting than the
fact that the most extreme categories of social violence are still quite
rare in the general population. On the other hand, more interesting
game may be afoot. Suppose, counterbalancing the Zimring-Cook ef-
fect, there were something that might be called the Robert Heinlein
effect, after the science-fiction author who coined the aphorism "an
armed society is a polite society."2' There are plenty of historical ex-
amples,22 and a sophisticated theory to organize them,23 that demon-
21 James P. Pinkerton, Column Right: Nuification: Wrong in 1832 and in 1995, LA
TimEs, October 12, 1995, at 9 (quoting Robert Heinlein).
22 ROGFR D. McGRATH, GuNxoGHERS, t-hGHwAYMEN AND VIGILANTES (1984); Robert
Day, "Sooners" or "Goners," They Were Hell Bent on Grabbing Free Land, 20 SMiTHSONIAN 192,
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strate the ability of heavily armed populations to live together in
peace.24 Furthermore, what if there were also something that might
be called the Gary Kleck effect-the principle that while firearms
wounds are more serious than those inflicted by other weapons, hos-
tile confrontations that are mediated by firearms are less likely to lead
to woundings in the first place-true, whether the person with a gun
is a predator or a defender. In this case, the extra lethality of firearms
wounds might be negated by the fact that fewer wounds were inflicted
in the first place.2 5
The proposition that private firearms may possess some such
compensating utility has provoked massive public controversy in re-
cent years. This comes as a result of the fact that the program of the
American gun control movement, to restrict private firearms to recre-
ational activities and de-legitimatize them as a means of self-defense,
will seem misguided. It is not too grandiose to claim that if one could
verify the compensating utility hypothesis, or falsify it, one would pos-
sess the passe-partout to national firearms policy. On the firing line of
this controversy Kleck and his co-author Marc Gertz find that privately
owned firearms are used in as many as two and one-half million an-
nual instances of lawful self defense. This estimate is twenty or thirty
times higher than the figure given by the Justice Department's Na-
tional Household Victimization Survey, which for most purposes is
considered to be the best available measure of American crime statis-
tics. Which estimate is the better? Kleck and Gertz's argument
against too heavy a reliance on survey numbers is sensible enough: in
a world in which defending oneself and one's property is increasingly
stigmatized as barbaric-if not tortious or criminal-there is good
reason to suppose that survey respondents might not account for
themselves honestly, especially not to a government auditor.
To some extent it is an inherent limitation of survey research that
one can never be sure that self-reported instances of using firearms in
defense of self or property have been correctly or even defensibly tal-
lied by respondents. Nor can one be certain of how many correctly
self-reported cases involve criminals defending their contraband in-
ventory from other criminals. 26 Nor can we be confident that cases in
202 (1989).
2 3 John Umbeck, Might Makes Rights: A Theory of the Formation and Initial Distribution of
Property Rights, 19 ECON. INQUIRY 38, 40-46 (1981).
24 Daniel D. Polsby, Equal Protection, REASON MAG., OCt. 1993, at 34, 37.
25 KLEcK, supra note 5, at 163-64.
26 So far as the law is concerned, criminals havejust as much right to defend themselves
from unlawful force as anyone else, but it seems safe to suggest that as far as public policy is
concerned, this interest of criminals should be lightly regarded. Thought-experimental
proof: if the only utility of firearms were to allow criminals to use them in lawful self-
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which some sort of self defense might be privileged were also cases in
which the use of a firearm would be sanctioned.27 Kleck and Gertz
have made every effort to design their survey around the resulting
problems, but a more fundamental objection to their project remains.
Even if such survey research instruments could be made perfect-so
that every respondent accurately self-reported necessitous defensive
firearms use-it is questionable what information one would have ac-
quired. It is far from evident that counting self-defensive uses of fire-
arms is a meritorious index of private firearms' crime-suppressive
utility. Surely the real question is how much predatory behavior is
discouraged assuming a given diffusion of private firearms. The focus
of concern should not be the number of times a firearm was dis-
played, let alone how often one was discharged, and certainly not how
often someone was wounded or killed. What one should really want
to know is the number of times overt threats were made unnecessary
because the existing distribution of firearms set up an implicit threat
potent enough to make explicit threats unnecessary.28 In other
words, one must ask what distribution of private arms is optimal in
society. Of course this question presents variables one cannot count
(e.g., how many times did a burglary or a rape or a murder not-hap-
pen), and asks one to value these non-events in relation to how money
might be invested alternatively in firearms in order to produce compa-
rable levels of personal security. As no one can possibly perform this
calculation, abstruse even if it were not beset with unknowns, one is
consigned to trying to count instances in which "good guys" used guns
to run off "bad guys" who were threatening them unlawfully. One is
reminded here of that ancientjoke about the man who lost his keys in
a dark alley but looked for them under a lamp post because there the
light was better.
The connection between the data concerning the dispersion of
defense, we should have no difficulty embracing and trying to enforce a universal gun ban
because, ex hypothesis, the only people who would be made worse off thereby would be
criminals.
27 Defenders are never privileged to use deadly weapons when it would be reasonable
to use non-deadly weapons -or none at all. Furthermore, a number of states follow the
Model Penal Code rule that certain circumstances require retreat before deadly force may
lawfully be used.
28 Some scholars have taken a crack at pondering the imponderable. For example,
David Kopel writes:
Only for one category of violent crime, namely, burglary, does the British rate
exceed the American rate. Burglary is a more socially destructive crime in Britain
because most British burglars attack houses when a victim is present. A 1982 survey
found 59 percent of attempted burglaries take place against an occupied home, com-
pared to just 13 percent in the United States. Fear of being shot convinces most Amer-
ican burglars to strike empty targets. [citations omitted.]
DAVID KoPEL, THE SAMURAI, THE MOUNnM AND THE CowBoy 92, 127 (1992).
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firearms on the one hand, and the homicide statistics on the other is
strikingly irregular. For example, we know that firearms ownership
correlates positively with household income, 29 and recent figures
from a survey of Chicago and its suburbs show a marked inverse corre-
lation between the density of handgun ownership in a given neighbor-
hood and the rates of homicide and other serious crimes.3 0 To
generalize about the American population as a whole, homicide has
been trending downward over the past decade or so;31 the rebound of
the homicide rate to its very high, late-1970s level of nine or greater in
100,000 looks to be essentially explainable by the rapid increase in
rates of both commission and victimization of homicide among popu-
lations of urban, African-American, teenage boys. It is not widely ap-
preciated that this spike in the statistics dates only from the mid-1980s
and is not at all associated either with the relaxation of firearms regu-
lation laws or with increases in the supply or practical availability of
firearms. Something changed around 1984 or 1985-but what? Al-
fred Blumstein pins the rap just where it chiefly belongs, namely, on
changes in the retail market for drugs and in law enforcement efforts
to control the drug market. Not only did the bull market for crack
cocaine greatly multiply the number of illegal retail transactions that
occurred (this being the point in the distribution chain that is most
vulnerable to police intervention), but it also seems to have involved a
new and younger class of distributors, taking advantage, perhaps, of
the relative lenity of the juvenile justice system.3 2 Juveniles' debut in
this marketplace demanded a gun for protection of self, remittances,
and inventory, and for sustaining a reputation that would facilitate
treating one's elders on terms of proper respect.3 3 To this parvenu
class of criminals, the economic opportunities in the cocaine market
were perceived to be greater, and may actually have been greater,
than those that were available in the straight world, notwithstanding
the enormous risks to life, limb, and liberty that resulted.
3 4
With respect to the firearms side of this problem, it cannot be
emphasized too strongly that one is dealing with a demand-led rather than
a supply-led phenomenon-young men demanding guns as a means of self
defense and self-realization. These young men are not merely using
29 KLEcK, supra note 5, at 23.
30 Metro Chicago Information Center, Summary of Neighborhood Crime Perceptions, in
1991-1995 MCIC METRO SURVEY (1995).
31 E.g., BuREAu OF JuSTICE STATSriCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINALJUSTICE STATISTICS 1993, at 388, figure 3.7 (1994).
3 2 Jean Rimbach, Crime Without Punishment - Many Youths See System as "a joke," BERGEN
CouNy REc. (N.J), Feb. 2, 1994, at Al.
33 Elijah Anderson, The Code of the Street, 273 ATLANTIC MONTHLY, May 1994, at 81.
34 Reuter & Kleiman, supra note 11, at 303.
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guns because large numbers of them are floating around, as mayors
and police chiefs insinuate when they tell reporters that "there are too
many guns out there." Recognizing this problem as a demand-side
situation predicts the limited usefulness (if not futility) of public poli-
cies that seek to "dry up" the supply of guns. The most ludicrous poli-
cies of this type are "turn-in-your-gun days" or rules that prohibit
police departments from selling surplus weapons. But many kinds of
regulatory interventions that place burdens on legal markets embrace
the same faulty premise.
Nevertheless, optimists remain who believe that supply-reduction
techniques might hold the key to the reduction of gun violence.
Among these people, none is more incorrigibly optimistic than Philip
Cook. Along with his collaborators Stephanie Molliconi and Thomas
Cole, Cook concedes the difficulties of trying to regulate the posses-
sion and use of the two-hundred-plus million firearms already in place
in the United States. He reasons that because guns used in crimes will
tend to have been recently acquired, "[a]n effective transfer-regulat-
ing scheme that prevents guns from going to dangerous people would
be nearly as successful [in suppressing the homicide rate] as a much
more intrusive scheme targeted at current gun owners."35
Indeed, this premise is almost tautologically true, but the trick is:
how does one successfully regulate a market for a commodity for
which there exist no satisfactory substitutes and which is demanded by
people whose disposition to comply with the law is less than that of
average citizens, and whose willingness to take risks is greater? De-
spite the hopefulness of Cook et al. on this score, it is by no means
clear that introducing additional restrictions into (currently legal)
firearms markets-cutting down on sales through classified ads or gun
shows or the like-will have much effect disarming those prone to
firearms abuse. For illustration: it has been widely noticed that the
effectiveness of local gun control laws can be defeated by gun runners,
who load up on guns in low regulation jurisdictions and sell them-
illegally-in high regulation jurisdictions. Several years ago it was
widely noticed that many of the guns seized from criminals by Wash-
ington, D.C., police had originally been procured in Virginia. Public
indignation led to Virginia enacting a law that would allow only one
gun per month to be purchased legally by a given individual.36
This exercise damaged the Capital's illicit gun market little if at
all; the gun runners simply moved a few states south, to Georgia,
35 Philip Cook et al., Regulating Gun Markets, 86 J. CiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 59, 63
(1995).
36 E.g., Rene Sanchez, Building an Arsenal One Gun at a Time, WAsH. Posr, Nov. 3, 1993,
at Al; Donald Baker, Wilder Signs Gun Control Bil WASH. PoST, Mar. 24, 1993, at Cl.
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where no such rationing is practiced. Of course it is easy to turn this
observation into a plea for Georgia now to do something (which
would move the action to Texas or Arkansas) and thence into a po-
lemic for a national firearms law; but that sort of twist in the argument
tends to obscure the source of the difficulty, which does not lie in the
disuniformities or inadequacies of various states' firearms laws but in
the fundamental economics of the crime business. Of course gun
runners will seek the least cost and most convenient source of supply,
whatever it may be, legal markets, if available, but if they cannot de-
liver what is demanded, the turn to illegal markets, of smuggled guns
or guns manufactured in cottage industry, is a simple operation. The
acquisition behavior of illicit retail customers should be discouraged
modestly at best by piling costs on gun runners. These customers are
seeking to invest in capital plant for which there exists no ready substi-
tutes. Licit buyers, on the other hand, usually are shopping for items
of personal consumption, for which a number of obvious substitutes
(e.g., archery; B-B guns; and for that matter, going to the movies)
evidently exist. The implication of this situation, though usually ig-
nored, is very important: the price sensitivity of firearms buyers will dimin-
ish as their motive for owning a firearm becomes more sinister. The price
sensitivity of buyers will increase as their motive for owning a firearm becomes
more innocuous.
The expectation that the sorts of market interventions described
by Cook et ?1. would have a beneficial effect on the homicide rate
embeds the assumption of monotonicity, that is, that there are con-
stant returns (in the form of lowered homicide rates) to reductions in
the number of firearms in private hands. Those who in any degree
credit the possibility of Heinlein or Kleck effects operating, however,
and who understand the implication of the distinction between "fire-
arm as capital" and "firearm as toy," will regard this assumption as
rather naive. Such students of the problem will consider the question
of how firearms are distributed in society as much more important
than how many there are. They will also reject as inherently counter-
productive efforts to adopt policies that aim at reducing the number
of arms in the hands of criminals by imposing regulatory costs in licit
markets.37
37 Daniel D. Polsby, The False Promise of Gun Contro4 273 ATL.Nxnc MONTHLY, Mar. 1994
at 57.
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